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 NATIONAL MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE PROHIBITIONS IN THE BTWC 
 




1.  At the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC) it was agreed1: 
 
 To hold three annual meetings of the States Parties of one week duration each year 
commencing in 2003 until the Sixth Review Conference, to be held not later than the 
end of 2006, to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action 
on: 
 
i.  The adoption of necessary, national measures to implement the prohibitions 
set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation; 
 
ii.  National mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight 
of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins; 
 
iii.  Enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or 
suspicious outbreaks of disease; 
 
iv.  Strengthening and broadening national and international institutional 
efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and 
combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants; 
 
v.  The content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. 
 
and that "Each meeting of the States Parties will be prepared by a two week meeting of 
experts."   This Briefing Paper considers the first topic to be addressed in 2003, namely "The 
adoption of necessary, national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the 
Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation;".    
 
2.  In Briefing Paper No. 22 it was noted that the annual meeting of States Parties would 
ideally develop a text that would integrate  
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a.   the States Parties' verdict on the experts' recommendations, commending those it 




b.  the relevant language in Final Declarations, arranged and tabulated by the 
secretariat for the meetings of experts and of States Parties.  
 
3.  This Briefing Paper provides an input to the meetings of experts and of the States Parties 
by first collecting the relevant language from Final Declarations regarding national measures 
and then providing an example, drawing on the legislation and other regulatory measures for 
one State Party, of the input on national measures that all States Parties should be able to 
make to the meetings.   There is much to be said, as was noted in Briefing Paper No.23, for 
States Parties providing their legislation, regulations and other measures of BTWC national 
implementation prior to the experts meeting. 
 
The requirement for national measures 
 
4.  Article IV of the Convention requires that:    
  
 Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, 
production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, 
equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the 
territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. 
 
5. Article IV obliges each State Party to ensure national implementation in the broadest 
possible terms, as the scope clauses at the end of the Article spell out clearly.   Although the 
word legislation does not appear in this Article, the commonest response to this obligation 
among those States Parties which have made known any response whatever (and they are thus 
far all too few) has been either to legislate in such a way as to give domestic legal effect to the 
prohibitions contained in Article I, or to determine on examination of their existing laws that 
no further specific legislation is necessary. In recent years a growing concern about 
bioterrorism has reinforced the case for enacting specific legislation, and also for 
strengthening such legislation as already exists.  It has also given governments a greater sense 
of urgency, as it has come to be recognised that legislation to give domestic legal effect to 
BTWC prohibitions is a vital element in their efforts to counter terrorist threats. National 
implementation also embraces government decrees, regulations and administrative 
memoranda to law enforcement agencies, but little is yet known of what action, if any, States 
Parties have taken under those headings.  It is understandable, therefore, that national 
implementation has come to be identified closely with the adoption of new legislation. 
 
6.    Such legislation ties the Convention into national legal systems in the clearest possible 
way.  It contributes to the strengthening of compliance by expanding the constituency with an 
institutional interest in the success of the Convention.  It also builds the treaty regime flowing 
from the Convention into normative structures at the national level, in the form of rules and 
expectations and procedures for upholding them.  These rules, expectations and procedures in 
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5 
turn uphold their counterparts at the international level.  They shore up the international treaty 
regime and help, even if only marginally, to ensure its survival by constituting one more 
obstacle which would have to be overcome if the Convention were to come under attack. 
 
The evolution of common understandings 
 
7.  Successive Review Conferences have seen the evolution of common understandings 
regarding Article IV.  The first four Review Conferences reinforced Article IV with 
successive layers of consensually agreed language, as each Final Declaration built on its 
predecessor and added new material to the inherited paragraphs.  This cumulative process 
records, reaffirms and extends the common understandings of States Parties with regard to 
the implications and implementation of Article IV. 
 
8.  In 1980 the First Review Conference the Article IV section of the Final Declaration4 stated 
that: 
 
The Conference notes the provisions of Article IV, which requires each State Party to 
take any necessary measure to prohibit and prevent the development, production, 
stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and 
means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within its territory, under 
its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere, and calls upon all States Parties which 
have not yet taken any necessary measures in accordance with their constitutional 
processes to do so immediately. 
 
The Conference invites States Parties which have found it necessary to enact specific 
legislation or take other regulatory measures relevant to this Article to make 
available the appropriate texts to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, for the 
purposes of consultation. 
 
The language in the second paragraph had resulted from proposals made by the United 
Kingdom, with Belgian and Finnish support. 
 
9.  In 1986 at the Second Review Conference, the language in the Article IV section of the 
Final Declaration5 was extended to some four paragraphs: 
 
The Conference notes the importance of Article IV, under which each State Party 
shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to 
prohibit or prevent any acts or actions which would contravene the Convention. 
 
The Conference calls upon all States Parties which have not yet taken any necessary 
measures in accordance with their constitutional processes, as required by the 
Article, to do so immediately. 
 
                                                 
4United Nations, The First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, Final Document, BWC/CONF.I/10, 21 March 1980, p. 7. Available at 
http://www.opbw.org 
5United Nations, The Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 8–26 September 1986, Final Document, BWC/CONF.II/13/11, 26 September 1986, pp. 4-
5.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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The Conference notes that States Parties, as requested by the First Review 
Conference, have provided to the United Nations Department for Disarmament 
Affairs information on and the texts of specific legislation enacted or other regulatory 
measures taken by them, relevant to this Article. The Conference invites States Parties 
to continue to provide such information and texts to the United Nations Department 
for Disarmament Affairs for purposes of consultation. 
 
The Conference notes the importance of: 
 
- legislative, administrative and other measures designed effectively to 
guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Convention within the 
territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, 
 
- legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and 
facilities to prevent unauthorised access to and removal of pathogenic or toxic 
material, and 
 
- inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military 
educational programmes of information dealing with the prohibition of 
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and the provisions of the 
Geneva Protocol 
 
and believes that such measures which States might undertake in accordance with 
their constitutional process would strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention. 
 
10.  This therefore repeated the invitation first made at the First Review Conference6 to  
 
 States Parties which have found it necessary to enact specific legislation or take other 
regulatory measures relevant to this Article to make available the appropriate texts to 
the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, for [the] purposes of consultation. 
 
In addition, the Second Review Conference also repeated the 1980 call 
 
upon all States Parties which have not yet taken any necessary measures in 
accordance with their constitutional processes, as required by the Article, to do so 
immediately.7  [The words emphasised were added in 1986.] 
 
11.   The Second Review Conference also took a modest step forward in regime-building for 
strengthening compliance with the Convention on the foundations of Article IV.  It did so by 
widening, on the initiative of the then German Democratic Republic, the range of national 
                                                 
6United Nations, The First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 3–21 March 1980, Final Document, BWC/CONF.I/10, 21 March 1980, p. 7. Available at 
http://www.opbw.org The intrusive the was deleted when the invitation was repeated in 1986 "for purposes of 
consultation," the Australian delegation, in editing the text for the Drafting Committee, having restored the 
original UK language at the request of its author. 
7United Nations, The Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 8–26 September 1986, Final Document, BWC/CONF.II/13/11, 26 September 1986, pp. 4-
5.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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implementation actions which were given international commendation.  After repeating the 
invitations contained in the 1980 declaration as indicated above it added a new passage: 
 
 The Conference notes the importance of 
 
- legislative, administrative and other measures designed effectively to 
guarantee compliance with the with the provisions of the Convention within 
the territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party; 
 
- legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to 
prevent unauthorised access to and removal of pathogenic or toxic material; 
and 
 
- inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military educational 
programmes of information dealing with the prohibition of bacteriological 
(biological) and toxin weapons and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol 
 
and believes that such measures which States might undertake in accordance with 
their constitutional process[es] would strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention.8 
 
12.  In 1991, the Third Review Conference further developed the regime with the Article IV 
section of the Final Declaration9 stating that: 
 
The Conference notes the importance of Article IV, under which each State Party 
shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to 
prohibit or prevent any acts or actions which would contravene the Convention. 
 
The Conference notes those measures already taken by some States Parties in this 
regard, for example the adoption of penal legislation, and reiterates its call to any 
State Party that has not yet taken any necessary measures to do so immediately, in 
accordance with its constitutional processes. Such measures should apply within the 
territory of a State Party, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. The 
Conference invites each State Party to consider, if constitutionally possible and in 
conformity with international law, the application of such measures to actions taken 
anywhere by natural persons possessing its nationality. 
 
The Conference notes the importance of: 
 
                                                 
8United Nations, The Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 8–26 September 1986, Final Document, BWC/CONF.II/13/11, 26 September 1986, pp. 4-
5. Available at http://www.opbw.org  Process in the last line of this text seems to have been a typographic error 
in the Final Declaration carried through to the Final Document.  It was corrected to processes when the 1986 
text was repeated in 1991.   The GDR proposal of 1986 (which used the plural processes) is reproduced in 
BWC/CONF.II/9 (22 September 1986), Annex, pp.16-17. 
9United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 9–27 September 1991, Final Document, BWC/CONF.III/23/Part II, 1992, pp.12-13. 
Available at http://www.opbw.org  In this Briefing Paper by changing "States parties" to "States Parties", and by 
inserting capitals in the title of the BTWC, capitalization has been made consistent with UN practice as correctly 
applied in the Final Documents of 1980, 1986, 1996 and 2002. 
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- Legislative, administrative and other measures designed effectively to 
enhance domestic compliance with the Convention; 
 
- Legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to 
prevent unauthorized access to and removal of microbial or other biological 
agents, or toxins; 
 
- Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military educational 
programmes of information dealing with the prohibition of microbial or other 
biological agents or toxins and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol. 
 
The Conference believes that such measures which States Parties might undertake in 
accordance with their constitutional processes would strengthen the effectiveness of 
the Convention. 
 
The Conference notes that some States Parties, as requested by the Second Review 
Conference, have provided to the United Nations Department for Disarmament 
Affairs information on and texts of specific legislation enacted or other measures 
taken to assure domestic compliance with the Convention. The Conference invites 
these States Parties, and encourages all States Parties, to provide such information 
and texts in the future. In this regard the Conference welcomes agreement by the 
States Parties participating in the Third Review Conference to implement a new 
confidence-building measure entitled "Declaration of legislation, regulations and 
other measures". In addition, the Conference invites all States Parties to provide any 
useful information on the implementation of such measures. 
 
The Conference welcomes regional measures such as the Mendoza Declaration as 
well as other initiatives dealing with the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction, 
including biological weapons, as concrete positive steps towards the strengthening of 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention regime. 
 
13.  The Third Review Conference thus continued the process of regime-building in this area, 
repeating the declarations of 1980 and 1986 and adding to them, notably, a new confidence-
building measure entitled ‘Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures’.10   The 
Annex contained the following on CBM "E": 
 
6. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE "E" 
 
- Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures 
 
At the Third Review Conference the States Parties agreed to implement the following: 
 
As an indication of the measures which they have taken to implement the Convention, 
States Parties shall declare whether they have legislation, regulations or other 
measures: 
 
(a) to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or 
retention of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, weapons, 
                                                 
10BWC/CONF. III/22/Add. 2 (27 September 1991) pp 4-5, p 7. 
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equipment and means of delivery, specified in Article I of the Convention, 
within their territory or anywhere under their jurisdiction or control; 
 
(b) in relation to the export or import of micro-organisms pathogenic to 
man, animals and plants or of toxins in accordance with the Convention; 
 
States Parties shall complete the attached form (Form E) and shall be prepared to 
submit copies of the legislation or regulations, or written details of other measures on 
request to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs or to an 
individual State Party.  On an annual basis States Parties shall indicate, also on the 
attached form, whether or not there has been any amendment to their legislation, 
regulations or other measures. 
 
Form E was elaborated as follows: 
Form E 
 
Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures 
 
Relating to    Legislation Regulations Other  Amended 
         measures since last
           year 
 
(a) Development, production 
stockpiling, acquisition 
or retention of microbial 
or other biological agents, 
or toxins, weapons, equip- 
ment and means of delivery 
specified in Article I    YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO 
 
(b) Exports of micro-organisms*   YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO 
and toxins 
 
(c) Imports of micro-organisms*   YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO 
and toxins 
 
14.   The new CBM, labelled E, in the Annex11 to the Final Declaration went beyond simply 
addressing those States Parties which had legislated or taken other implementing action in 
this area. It asked every State Party to complete a straightforward annual questionnaire 
answering four questions yes/no: 
 
- do you have legislation? 
- do you have regulations? 
- do you have other measures? 
                                                 
* Micro-organisms pathogenic to man, animals and plants in accordance with the Convention. 
11United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 9–27 September 1991, Final Document, BWC/CONF.III/23/Part II, 1992, Annex, pp.42-
43. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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- has there been any amendment since last year to your legislation, regulations 
 or other measures? 
 
These four questions were applied to three areas of policy, requiring twelve yes/no answers 
altogether.  The first area of policy was the direct concern of Article IV with giving domestic 
legal effect to the prohibitions in Article I.  The second and third were export and import 
control respectively, specified as the "export or import of micro-organisms pathogenic to 
man, animals and plants or of toxins in accordance with the Convention.”  These export and 
import controls were of particular concern to the United Kingdom, which successfully 
proposed their insertion.   The CBM would otherwise have been limited to making more 
universal and systematic the invitations issued in 1980, 1986 and 1991 with regard to giving 
domestic legal effect to the prohibitions in Article I, and sharing information.  The CBM, 
however, shifts the emphasis from the sharing of texts -- although texts could still be 
requested -- to sharing information on the status of each State Party in terms of measures 
taken or not taken. 
 
15.   The information-sharing ambitions of the Third Review Conference in this area went 
further still.  From 15 April 1992 States Parties, under Confidence-Building Measure E, 
 
 shall be prepared to submit copies of the legislation or regulations or written details 
of other measures on request to the United Nations Department for Disarmament 
Affairs or to an individual State Party.12 
 
Each State Party can now, therefore, request these details bilaterally under the authority of 
the Third Review Conference, instead of depending solely upon the circulation of texts made 
available to the United Nations.  This extension to provide for bilateral requests has not been 
recorded explicitly in any Final Declaration, but it is still one part of the politically binding 
requirement of CBM 'E'.  It therefore represents one of the common understandings which 
have evolved out of Article IV.  It could become more important as States Parties take a 
greater interest in the status and effectiveness of other States Parties' legislation, and whether 
it is sufficiently strong and comprehensive to contribute to security overall.  They can check 
one another's legislative performance individually, and make their own assessment of its 
adequacy.   The possibility of requesting these details bilaterally could be used to bring 
diplomatic pressure to bear on any State Party which was thought, by reason of the 
inadequacy of its national measures, to be leaving open loopholes which bioterrorists or 
others might exploit to the detriment of everyone's security.  To "be prepared to submit 
copies of the legislation or regulations or written details of other measures on request" is to 
accept that these texts are of legitimate interest to individual States Parties and that their 
requests are in accord with the common understanding of what Article IV implies for each 
State Party. 
 
16.  The Fourth Review Conference in 1996 in the Article IV section of the Final 
Declaration13 continued to strengthen the regime by stating that: 
                                                 
12United Nations, The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 9–27 September 1991, Final Document, BWC/CONF.III/23/Part II, 1992, pp.12-13. 
Available at http://www.opbw.org 
13United Nations, The Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Document, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996, Part II. pp. 




1. The Conference underlines the importance of Article IV. It reaffirms the 
commitment of States Parties to take the necessary national measures under this 
Article, in accordance with their constitutional processes. These measures are to 
ensure the prohibition and prevention of the development, production, stockpiling, 
acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of 
delivery specified in Article I of the Convention anywhere within their territory, under 
their jurisdiction or under their control, in order to prevent their use for purposes 
contrary to the Convention. The States Parties recognize the need to ensure, through 
the review and/or adoption of national measures, the effective fulfilment of their 
obligations under the Convention in order, inter alia, to exclude use of biological and 
toxin weapons in terrorist or criminal activity.  
 
2. The Conference notes those measures already taken by a number of States Parties 
in this regard, for example the adoption of penal legislation, and reiterates its call to 
any State Party that has not yet taken any necessary measures to do so immediately, 
in accordance with its constitutional processes. Such measures should apply within its 
territory, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. The Conference invites 
each State Party to consider, if constitutionally possible and in conformity with 
international law, the application of such measures also to actions taken anywhere by 
natural persons possessing its nationality. 
 
3. The Conference notes the importance of: 
 
- Legislative, administrative and other measures designed to enhance domestic 
compliance with the Convention; 
 
- Legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to 
prevent unauthorized access to and removal of microbial or other biological 
agents, or toxins:  
 
- Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military education 
programmes of information dealing with the prohibitions and provisions 
contained in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925. 
 
4. The Conference believes that such measures which States Parties might undertake 
in accordance with their constitutional processes would strengthen the effectiveness 
of the Convention, as requested by the Second and Third Review Conferences. 
 
5. The Conference notes that some States Parties, as requested by the Second Review 
Conference, have provided to the United Nations Department for Disarmament 
Affairs information on the texts of specific legislation enacted or other measures 
taken to assure domestic compliance with the Convention. The Conference invites 
these States Parties, and encourages all States Parties, to provide such information 
and texts in the future. In this regard the Conference welcomes information provided 
by States Parties in response to the confidence-building measure agreed to at the 
Third Review Conference entitled "Declaration of legislation, regulations and other 
measures". In addition, the Conference encourages all States Parties to provide any 




6. The Conference encourages cooperation and initiatives, including regional ones, 
towards the strengthening and implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention regime. 
 
7. The Conference reaffirms that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological 
(biological) and toxin weapons is effectively prohibited by the Convention. 
 
17.  The opening paragraph not only said that the Conference "underlines the importance" 
rather than, as at the Third Review Conference, "notes the importance" of Article IV but it 
went on, unlike the simple single sentence in the Third Review Conference, to set out what 
the "necessary measures" required under Article IV should be: 
 
These measures are to ensure the prohibition and prevention of the development, 
production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, 
equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention anywhere 
within their territory, under their jurisdiction or under their control, in order to 
prevent their use for purposes contrary to the Convention.  
 
and went on to stress the importance of national measures in excluding the use of biological 
or toxin weapons in terrorist or criminal activity: 
 
The States Parties recognize the need to ensure, through the review and/or adoption 
of national measures, the effective fulfilment of their obligations under the 
Convention in order, inter alia, to exclude use of biological and toxin weapons in 
terrorist or criminal activity.  
 
18.  The second paragraph used identical language to that of the Third Review Conference to 
note those measures already taken by some States in regard to the implementation of Article 
IV, such as the adoption of penal legislation, and reiterated its call to any State Party that had 
not yet taken any necessary measures to do so immediately.    Such measures should apply 
within the territory of a State Party, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.    The 
Conference also invited each State Party to consider the application of such measures to 
actions taken anywhere by natural persons possessing its nationality. 
 
19.    The third and fourth paragraphs also used identical language to that of the Third Review 
Conference in also noting the importance of: 
 
- Legislative, administrative and other measures designed to enhance domestic 
compliance with the Convention; 
 
- Legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to 
prevent unauthorised access to and removal of microbial or other biological agents, 
or toxins; 
 
- Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military educational 
programmes of information dealing with the prohibition of microbial or other 
biological agents or toxins and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. 
 




20.    The fifth paragraph also used identical language to that of the Third Review Conference 
in noting that some States Parties, as requested by the Second Review Conference (and before 
then by the First Review Conference), had provided to the United Nations Department for 
Disarmament Affairs information on and the texts of specific legislation enacted or other 
measures taken to assure domestic compliance with the Convention.    The Conference 
invited these States Parties, and encouraged all States Parties, to provide such information 
and texts in the future.    The Conference also welcomed the information provided by States 
Parties in response to the agreement by States Parties participating in the Third Review 
Conference to implement a new confidence-building measure entitled "Declaration of 
legislation, regulations and other measures."    In addition the Conference invited all States 
Parties to provide any useful information on the implementation of such measures. 
 
21.  The sixth paragraph reflected a similar sense to the language in the corresponding 
paragraph in the Third Review Conference but used different more general language referring 
to "cooperation and initiatives": 
 
The Conference encourages cooperation and initiatives, including regional ones, 
towards the strengthening and implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention regime. 
 
22.  The final paragraph was new, having no parallel in the Third Review Conference, with 
language reaffirming that use is effectively prohibited by the Convention: 
 
The Conference reaffirms that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological 
(biological) and toxin weapons is effectively prohibited by the Convention. 
 
The developing regime for Article IV 
 
23.   The developments thus far of the regime for Article IV over the first four Review 
Conferences can usefully be summarised in tabular form using bold text to highlight the 
developments in successive Final Declarations.  First in regard to the fundamental 






Article IV Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and 
prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or 
retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of 
delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of 
such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. 
 
14 
1st Review Conference The Conference notes the provisions of Article IV, which requires 
each State Party to take any necessary measure to prohibit and 
prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or 
retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of 
delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within its territory, 
under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere, and calls upon 
all States Parties which have not yet taken any necessary measures 




The Conference notes the importance of Article IV, under which each 
State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, 
take any necessary measures to prohibit or prevent any acts or 
actions which would contravene the Convention. 
 
The Conference calls upon all States Parties which have not yet taken 
any necessary measures in accordance with their constitutional 
processes, as required by the Article, to do so immediately. 
3rd Review Conference The Conference notes the importance of Article IV, under which each 
State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take 
any necessary measures to prohibit or prevent any acts or actions 
which would contravene the Convention. 
 
The Conference notes those measures already taken by some States 
Parties in this regard, for example the adoption of penal legislation, 
and reiterates its call to any State Party that has not yet taken any 
necessary measures to do so immediately, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes. Such measures should apply within the 
territory of a State Party, under its jurisdiction or under its control 
anywhere. The Conference invites each State Party to consider, if 
constitutionally possible and in conformity with international law, 
the application of such measures to actions taken anywhere by 




4th Review Conference 1. The Conference underlines the importance of Article IV. It 
reaffirms the commitment of States Parties to take the necessary 
national measures under this Article, in accordance with their 
constitutional processes. These measures are to ensure the 
prohibition and prevention of the development, production, 
stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, 
equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the 
Convention anywhere within their territory, under their jurisdiction 
or under their control, in order to prevent their use for purposes 
contrary to the Convention. The States Parties recognize the need to 
ensure, through the review and/or adoption of national measures, 
the effective fulfilment of their obligations under the Convention in 
order, inter alia, to exclude use of biological and toxin weapons in 
terrorist or criminal activity.  
 
2. The Conference notes those measures already taken by a number of 
States Parties in this regard, for example the adoption of penal 
legislation, and reiterates its call to any State Party that has not yet 
taken any necessary measures to do so immediately, in accordance 
with its constitutional processes. Such measures should apply within 
its territory, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. The 
Conference invites each State Party to consider, if constitutionally 
possible and in conformity with international law, the application of 
such measures also to actions taken anywhere by natural persons 
possessing its nationality. 
 
24.  Secondly, in regard to the provision of texts of legislation and other regulatory measures 
for the purposes of consultation: 
 
1st Review Conference The Conference invites States Parties which have found it necessary 
to enact specific legislation or take other regulatory measures 
relevant to this Article to make available the appropriate texts to the 




The Conference notes that States Parties, as requested by the First 
Review Conference, have provided to the United Nations 
Department for Disarmament Affairs information on and the texts 
of specific legislation enacted or other regulatory measures taken by 
them, relevant to this article. The Conference invites States Parties to 
continue to provide such information and texts to the United Nations 




3rd Review Conference The Conference notes that some States Parties, as requested by the 
Second Review Conference, have provided to the United Nations 
Department for Disarmament Affairs information on and texts of 
specific legislation enacted or other measures taken to assure 
domestic compliance with the Convention. The Conference invites 
these States Parties, and encourages all States Parties, to provide 
such information and texts in the future. In this regard the 
Conference welcomes agreement by the States Parties participating 
in the Third Review Conference to implement a new confidence-
building measure entitled "Declaration of legislation, regulations 
and other measures". In addition, the Conference invites all States 
Parties to provide any useful information on the implementation of 
such measures. 
4th Review Conference 5. The Conference notes that some States Parties, as requested by the 
Second Review Conference, have provided to the United Nations 
Department for Disarmament Affairs information on the texts of 
specific legislation enacted or other measures taken to assure 
domestic compliance with the Convention. The Conference invites 
these States Parties, and encourages all States Parties, to provide 
such information and texts in the future. In this regard the Conference 
welcomes information provided by States Parties in response to the 
confidence-building measure agreed to at the Third Review 
Conference entitled "Declaration of legislation, regulations and other 
measures". In addition, the Conference encourages all States Parties 
to provide any useful information on the implementation of such 
measures. 
 
25.  Thirdly, in regard to the wider range of national implementation actions which were 




The Conference notes the importance of 
 
- legislative, administrative and other measures 
designed effectively to guarantee compliance with the with the 
provisions of the Convention within the territory under the 
jurisdiction or control of a State Party; 
 
- legislation regarding the physical protection of 
laboratories and facilities to prevent unauthorised access to 
and removal of pathogenic or toxic material; and 
 
- inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and 
military educational programmes of information dealing with 
the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin 
weapons and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol 
 
and believes that such measures which States might undertake in 
accordance with their constitutional process would strengthen the 




3rd Review Conference The Conference notes the importance of: 
 
- Legislative, administrative and other measures designed 
effectively to enhance domestic compliance with the 
Convention; 
 
- Legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories 
and facilities to prevent unauthorized access to and removal 
of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins; 
 
- Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military 
educational programmes of information dealing with the 
prohibition of microbial or other biological agents or toxins 
and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol. 
 
The Conference believes that such measures which States Parties 
might undertake in accordance with their constitutional processes 
would strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention. 
4th Review Conference 3. The Conference notes the importance of: 
 
- Legislative, administrative and other measures designed to 
enhance domestic compliance with the Convention; 
 
- Legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories 
and facilities to prevent unauthorized access to and removal 
of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins:  
 
- Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military 
education programmes of information dealing with the 
prohibitions and provisions contained in the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 
1925. 
 
4. The Conference believes that such measures which States Parties 
might undertake in accordance with their constitutional processes 
would strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention, as requested by 
the Second and Third Review Conferences. 
 
26.  Finally, on cooperation and initiatives, including regional ones, which appeared first at 










3rd Review Conference The Conference welcomes regional measures such as the Mendoza 
Declaration as well as other initiatives dealing with the renunciation 
of weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons, as 
concrete positive steps towards the strengthening of the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention regime. 
4th Review Conference 6. The Conference encourages cooperation and initiatives, including 
regional ones, towards the strengthening and implementation of the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention regime. 
 
There was also a single paragraph on use which first appeared at the Fourth Review 
Conference: 
 
4th Review Conference 7. The Conference reaffirms that under all circumstances the use of 
bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons is effectively 
prohibited by the Convention. 
 
The New Process 
 
27.   The above is thus the background to the new process under which the expert meeting 
and the meeting of States Parties in 2003 will consider: 
 
i.  The adoption of necessary, national measures to implement the prohibitions set 
forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation; 
 
28.  This topic addresses a number of useful elements: 
 
a.  The adoption of such measures.  For an effective regime to implement the BTWC, 
it is vital that all States Parties have indeed adopted such measures.  The experience 
of the CWC is such that it is probable that only some of the States Parties will have 
adopted such measures.  This element should be extended to consider the provision of 
assistance to States Parties in their adoption of necessary measures -- and attention 
might usefully be directed to examining the potential for a model law that addresses 
both national measures required for the BTWC and the measures required for the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety -- the model law developed by the OPCW and the 
Association of Caribbean States to implement the CWC and the Rotterdam Prior 
Informed Consent Convention is a useful precedent.  In addition, given the 
international concerns about terrorism and the need for strengthened national anti-
terrorism legislation, this could provide another model whereby both the BTWC 
prohibitions and those for anti-terrorism might be addressed in a composite national 
measure. 
 
b.  National measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention.  
There are essentially two sets of prohibitions which need to be addressed -- those in 
Article I and those in Article III.  The prohibitions that need to be addressed are not 
limited just to the language in these Articles -- attention needs to be given to ensuring 
that the scope of the prohibitions is effective in addressing the extended 
understandings agreed by successive Review Conferences.  Thus the Final 
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Declaration14 of the Fourth Review Conference in regard to Article III affirms that 
Article III is sufficiently comprehensive to cover any recipient whatsoever at 
international, national or subnational levels and goes on in regard to its 
implementation to note that States Parties should also consider ways and means to 
ensure that individuals or subnational groups are effectively prevented from 
acquiring, through transfers, biological agents and toxins for other than peaceful 
purposes.  
 
c.  The effectiveness of these national measures.   The next element is to address what 
national measures are necessary to implement these prohibitions effectively -- and to 
ensure that these national measures are effective in their comprehensive capturing of 
the prohibitions.  These national measures need to apply to national biodefence 
programmes and there must be be no exclusions of military personnel or of military 
programmes. 
 
d.  The applicability of such national measures.  The Convention requires that such 
measures should apply within its territory, under its jurisdiction or under its control 
anywhere. In addition, it should be recalled that the Final Declaration of the Fourth 
Review Conference had invited each State Party to consider, if constitutionally 
possible and in conformity with international law, the application of such measures 
also to actions taken anywhere by natural persons possessing its nationality. 
 
e.  Inclusion of the enactment of penal legislation.  Successive Review Conferences 
have adopted language that encourages States Parties to consider penal legislation -- 
for example, the Fourth Review Conference Final Declaration language in the Article 
IV section states that "The Conference notes those measures already taken by a 
number of States Parties in this regard, for example the adoption of penal 
legislation, and reiterates its call to any State Party that has not yet taken any 
necessary measures to do so immediately, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes." [Emphasis added] 
 
Input on national measures 
 
29.   This section of the Briefing Paper provides an example, by drawing on the legislation 
and other regulatory measures for one State Party, of the input on national measures that all 
States Parties should be able to make, preferably prior, to the expert meeting to be held in 
2003.   The essential elements for effective national legislation and regulation include the 
following: 
 
a.  The enactment of the basic prohibitions of the BTWC into national legislation; 
 
b.  Regulatory measures relating to biological agents and toxins;  such measures are 
likely to include considerations relating to health and safety, to those working with the 
biological agents and toxins, to security of the biological agents and toxins, to 
protection of the environment, and to control of transfers, both nationally and 
internationally.    Many such regulatory measures will have been adopted primarily for 
                                                 
14United Nations, The Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Document, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996, Part II. pp. 
16-17.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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reasons unconnected with the implementation of the BTWC yet they contribute 




30.  An example of this is the United Kingdom's Biological Weapons Act15 enacted in 1974 
which sets out that: 
 
No person shall develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or retain-- 
 
(a) any biological agent or toxin of a type and in a quantity that has no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; or 
 
(b) any weapon, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use biological 
agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 
  
It goes on to define biological agent and toxin by stating that: 
 
In this section-- 
 
"biological agent" means any microbial or other biological agent; and 
"toxin" means any toxin, whatever its origin or method of production. 
 
and then setting out the penalty that: 
 
Any person contravening this section shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on 
conviction on indictment, be liable to imprisonment for life. 
 
31.  It will be noted that the language used in the Biological Weapons Act very closely 
parallels that in Article I of the Convention: 
 
Article I   
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to 
develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:  
 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;  
 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or 
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.  
 
32.  The Australian Crimes (Biological Weapons) Act 197616 also uses language that is 
closely similar to that in Article I of the Convention to set out the prohibition that: 
 
It is unlawful to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or retain: 
 
                                                 
15United Kingdom, Biological Weapons Act 1974.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
16Australia, Crimes (Biological Weapons) Act 1976. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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(a) microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; or 
 
(b) weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or 




33.  A comprehensive tabulation of UK legislative and regulatory measures relating to the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was provided in a tabulation submitted by the 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office to the House of Commons Select Commitee on Foreign 
Affairs and published in the Report of that committee issued on 3rd December 200217.   The 
10 page tabulation sets out legislative and regulatory measures for some 71 activities under 
the following headings: 
 
BTWC    12 activities 
Export Controls   9 activities 
Handling of Agents and Toxins 28 activities 
Genetic Work    10 activities 
Other Issues    12 activities 
 
Most of the specific pieces of legislation or regulatory measures referred to in the tabulation 
are available on the web18.    In this Briefing Paper, the principal measures relating to the 
handling of biological agents, to genetic work and to export controls are outlined below. 
 
Regulatory Measures: Handling of Biological Agents 
 
34.  It needs to be recognised that the regulations relating to pathogens that can cause human 
disease are aimed at protecting the health of those working with such agents and of those who 
may be exposed to such agents because of such work activities.  The regulations relating to 
animal and plant pathogens are aimed at preventing the spread of such diseases in the country 
and at preventing their release into the environment.  
 
35.  Human pathogens.  An example of the regulatory measures regarding human pathogens 
is the United Kingdom Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations, 200219.  The 
regulations are intended to protect both workers and others who may be exposed from work 
activities from the risks of hazardous substances.  In the context of the regulations, hazardous 
substances are anything which can harm health if they are not adequately controlled.  
Consequently, all pathogens and toxins are covered by these regulations. 
 
                                                 
17United Kingdom, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, The Biological Weapons Green Paper, 
First Report of Session 2002-03, issued 3rd December 2002, pp. Ev 25 -- 34.  Available at http://www. 
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/150/150.pdf 
18See, for example, under national legislation implementation on http://www.opbw.org 
19United Kingdom, Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations, 2002, Statutory Instrument S.I. 
2002/2677. Available at http://www. opbw.org  
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36.   The development of these regulatory measures in respect of biological agents was 
addressed in paragraphs 5 to 13 of a Briefing Paper issued in March 199820.   The 2002 
COSHH regulations define biological agent as: 
 
"biological agent" means a micro-organism, cell culture or human endo-parasite, 
whether or not genetically modified, which may cause infection, allergy, toxicity or 
otherwise create a hazard to human health"   
 
The basic approach in regard to substances hazardous to health, including biological agents,  
adopted in the COSHH regulations comprises of the following elements: 
 
a.  Assessment of risk to health created by work involving substances hazardous to 
health; 
b.  Prevention or control of exposure to substances hazardous to health; 
c.  Use of control measures, etc; 
d.  Maintainance, examination and testing of control measures; 
e.  Monitoring of exposure at the workplace 
f.   Health surveillance 
g.  Information, instruction and training for persons who may be exposed to 
substances hazardous to health; 
h.   Arrangements to deal with accidents, incidents and emergencies; 
 
Additional requirements apply to work with biological agents including: 
 
a.  Classification of biological agents; 
b.  Special control measures for laboratories, animal rooms and industrial processes; 
f.   List of employees exposed to certain biological agents (in Group 3 and Group 4); 
g.   Notification of the use of biological agents (in Groups 2, 3 and 4); 
h.  Notification of the consignment of biological agents (in Group 4); 
 
37.  Biological agents are categorized into four hazard Groups: 
 
Group 1 - unlikely to cause human disease; 
 
Group 2 - can cause human disease and may be a hazard to employees; it is unlikely 
to spread to the community and there is usually effective prophylaxis or treatment 
available; 
 
Group 3 - can cause severe human disease and may be a serious hazard to employees; 
it may spread to the community, but there is usually effective prophylaxis or treatment 
available; 
 
Group 4 - causes severe human disease and is a serious hazard to employees; it is 
likely to spread to the community and there is usually no effective prophylaxis or 
treatment available. 
 
                                                 
20Graham S. Pearson, Article X: Further Building Blocks, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, 




An approved list of the categorisation to be applied to biological agents is issued by the 
Health and Safety Executive21. 
 
38.  The regulations also set out the minimum requirements for containment measures in 
facilities and laboratories handling such biological agents as follows: 
 
(a) level 2 for activities which involve working with a Group 2 biological agent; 
 
(b) level 3 for activities which involve working with a Group 3 biological agent; 
 
(c) level 4 for activities which involve working with a Group 4 biological agent; 
 
(d) level 2 for laboratories which do not intentionally propagate, concentrate or 
otherwise increase the risk of exposure to a biological agent but work with materials 
in respect of which it is unlikely that a Group 3 or Group 4 biological agent is present; 
 
(e) level 3 or 4, where appropriate, for laboratories which do not intentionally 
propagate, concentrate or otherwise increase the risk of exposure to a Group 3 or 
Group 4 biological agent but where the employer knows, or it is likely, that such a 
containment level is necessary; and 
 
(f) level 3 for activities where it has not been possible to carry out a conclusive 
assessment but where there is concern that the activity might involve a serious health 
risk for employees. 
 
The basic requirement is thus that the containment level must match the hazard grouping of 
the agent as a minimum. 
 
39.  The COSHH 2002 requirements for containment levels include requirements regarding 
access and safe storage of biological agents as follows: 
 
Containment measure 2 3 4 
Access to be restricted to authorised persons 
only 
Yes Yes Yes, via air-
lock key 
procedure 
Safe storage of biological agents Yes Yes Yes, secure 
storage 
 
40.  The requirement for keeping a list of employees exposed to agents in Group 3 and Group 
4 is detailed as follows: 
 
List of employees exposed to certain biological agents 
 
4. - (1) Subject to sub-paragraph (2), every employer shall keep a list of employees 
exposed to a Group 3 or Group 4 biological agent, indicating the type of work done 
                                                 
21The latest approved list took effect from 1 February 2000 and is available in Health and Safety Executive, 
Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens, Second supplement to: Categorisation of biological agents 




and, where known, the biological agent to which they have been exposed, and records 
of exposures, accidents and incidents, as appropriate. 
 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) shall not apply where the results of the risk assessment indicate 
that - 
(a) the activity does not involve a deliberate intention to work with or use that 
biological agent; and 
(b) there is no significant risk to the health of employees associated with that 
biological agent. 
 
(3) The employer shall ensure that the list or a copy thereof is kept available in a 
suitable form for at least 40 years from the date of the last entry made in it. 
 
(4) The relevant doctor referred to in regulation 11, and any employee of that 
employer with specific responsibility for the health and safety of his fellow employees, 
shall have access to the list. 
 
(5) Each employee shall have access to the information on the list which relates to 
him personally. 
 
41.  The requirement for notification of first use is set out as follows: 
 
Notification of the use of biological agents 
 
5. - (1) Subject to sub-paragraphs (7) and (8), an employer shall not use for the first 
time one or more biological agents in Group 2, 3 or 4 at particular premises for any 
of the activities listed in paragraph 3(3) unless he has – 
 
(a) notified the Executive in writing of his intention to do so at least 20 
working days in advance, or such shorter period as the Executive may allow; 
(b) furnished with that notification the particulars specified in sub-paragraph 
(5); and 
(c) received the acknowledgement required by sub-paragraph (4). 
 
(2) Subject to sub-paragraphs (7) and (9), an employer shall not use a biological 
agent which is specified in Part V of this Schedule, except where the use of that agent 
has been notified to the Executive in accordance with sub-paragraph (1), for any of 
the activities listed in paragraph 3(3) unless he has - 
 
(a) notified the Executive in writing of his intention to do so at least 20 
working days in advance, or such shorter period as the Executive may allow; 
(b) furnished with that notification the particulars specified in sub-paragraph 
(5); and 
(c) received the acknowledgement required by sub-paragraph (4). 
 
(3) The Executive may accept a single notification under sub-paragraph (2) in respect 
of the use of more than one biological agent by the same person. 
 
(4) Upon receipt of the notification required by sub-paragraph (1) or (2), the 




(a) send to the notifier an acknowledgement of receipt; or 
(b) if the notification does not contain all of the particulars specified in sub-
paragraph (5) - 
(i) inform the notifier in writing of the further particulars required, 
and 
(ii) within 10 working days of receipt of those further particulars, send 
to the notifier an acknowledgement of receipt. 
 
(5) The particulars to be included in the notification referred to in sub-paragraphs (1) 
and (2) shall be - 
 
(a) the name and address of the employer and the address of the premises 
where the biological agent will be stored or used; 
(b) the name, qualifications and relevant experience of any employee of that 
employer with specific responsibility for the health and safety of his fellow 
employees; 
(c) the results of the risk assessment; 
(d) the identity of the biological agent and, if the agent does not have an 
approved classification, the Group to which the agent has been assigned; and 
(e) the preventive and protective measures that are to be taken. 
 
(6) Where there are changes to processes, procedures or the biological agent which 
are of importance to health or safety at work and which render the original 
notification invalid the employer shall notify the Executive forthwith in writing of 
those changes. 
 
(7) Sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply in relation to a biological agent where 
an intention to use that biological agent has been previously notified to the Executive 
in accordance with the Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 
2000. 
 
(8) The requirement in sub-paragraph (1) to notify first use of a biological agent in 
Group 2 or 3 shall not apply to an employer whose only use of that agent is in 
relation to the provision of a diagnostic service provided that use will not involve a 
process likely to propagate, concentrate or otherwise increase the risk of exposure to 
that agent. 
 
(9) The requirement in sub-paragraph (2) to notify use of a biological agent specified 
in Part V of this Schedule shall not apply to an employer whose only use of that agent 
is in relation to the provision of a diagnostic service provided that use will not involve 
a process likely to propagate, concentrate or otherwise increase the risk of exposure 
to that agent. 
 
42.  The requirement for notification of the consignment of biological agents is set out as: 
 
Notification of the consignment of biological agents 
 
6. - (1) An employer shall not consign a Group 4 biological agent or anything 
containing, or suspected of containing, such an agent to any other premises, whether 
or not those premises are under his ownership or control, unless he has notified the 
Executive in writing of his intention to do so at least 30 days in advance or before 
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such shorter time as the Executive may approve and with that notification has 
furnished the particulars specified in sub-paragraph (4). 
 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) shall not apply where - 
 
(a) the biological agent or material containing or suspected of containing 
such an agent is being consigned solely for the purpose of diagnosis; 
(b) material containing or suspected of containing the biological agent is 
being consigned solely for the purpose of disposal; or 
(c) the biological agent is or is suspected of being present in a human patient 
or animal which is being transported for the purpose of medical treatment. 
 
(3) Where a Group 4 biological agent is imported into Great Britain, the consignee 
shall give the notice required by sub-paragraph (1). 
 
(4) The particulars to be included in the notification referred to in sub-paragraph (1) 
shall be – 
 
(a) the identity of the biological agent and the volume of the consignment; 
(b) the name of the consignor; 
(c) the address of the premises from which it will be transported; 
(d) the name of the consignee; 
(e) the address of the premises to which it shall be transported; 
(f) the name of the transport operator responsible for the transportation; 
(g) the name of any individual who will accompany the consignment; 
(h) the method of transportation; 
(i) the packaging and any containment precautions which will be taken; 
(j) the route which will be taken; and 
(k) the proposed date of transportation. 
 
43.  Animal pathogens.   Different regulations apply in regard to animal and plant pathogens 
where the aim is to protect livestock and plants in the UK from disease.  The development of 
these regulatory measures in respect of animal pathogens was addressed in paragraphs 14 to 
16 of a Briefing Paper issued in March 199822.   The Specified Animal Pathogens Order 
(SAPO) 199823 entered into force on 1 April 1998 prohibits any person in Great Britain from 
having in his possession any specified animal pathogen or any carrier in which he knows such 
a pathogen is present except under the authority of a licence issued in writing by the 
appropriate Minister.   The specified animal pathogens are those organisms listed in the Order 
causing serious epidemic diseases of farm livestock.   The definition of disease is extended so 
as "to comprise any disease of animals and poultry which may be caused by one or more 





                                                 
22Graham S. Pearson, Article X: Further Building Blocks, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, 
Briefing Paper No.7 (First Series), March 1998, paragraph 14 - 16.  Available at http://www.brad.ac. 
uk/acad/sbtwc 
23United Kingdom, The Specified Animal Pathogens Order 1998, Statutory Instrument S.I. 1998/463. Available 




Eastern & Western equine encephalomyelitis viruses 
Foot and mouth disease virus 
Newcastle disease virus 
Rabies virus 
Rift Valley Fever virus 
Rinderpest virus 
Sheep pox and goat pox virus 
Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus 
 
44.   Laboratories holding and working with specified animal pathogens are subject to 
inspection to ensure that the containment conditions meet the requirements for the category of 
pathogen being held.   Such inspections will be made prior to a licence being issued for the 
specified animal pathogen.   These are categorized according to the risk that they pose to 
livestock and the environment.   These categories are not complementary to the hazard 
groups for human pathogens (see para 35 above) which are for the protection of employees.   
The animal pathogen categories are for the purpose of protecting animal health from escapes 
of organisms from a laboratory and not protection of workers in that laboratory.   The 
categories are: 
 
Group 1:  Disease-producing organism which are enzootic and do not produce 
notifiable disease. 
 
Group 2:  Disease producing organisms which are either exotic or produce 
notifiable disease, but have a low risk of spread from the laboratory. 
 
Group 3: Disease producing organism which are either exotic or produce 
notifiable disease and have a moderate risk of spread from the 
laboratory. 
 
Group 4: Disease producing organisms which are either exotic or produce a 
notifiable disease and have a high risk of spread from the laboratory.   
 
45.  Plant pathogens.  The aim of British legislation is to prevent the importation into Great 
Britain of any plant pathogen or pest that is not already established in Great Britain.  The 
development of these regulatory measures in respect of plant pathogens was addressed in 
paragraphs 17 to 22 of a Briefing Paper issued in March 199824.    Official controls that apply 
to the import, movement, and keeping of plants, plant pests and other material such as soil are 
laid down in the Plant Health (Great Britain) Order 199325 which entered into force on 1 June 
1993 and prohibits the importing into Great Britain from a third country any infected plants or 
plant pests.   Plant pests are defined in the Order as: 
 
""Plant pest" means pests of and harmful organisms liable to infect plants or plant 
products which belong to the animal or plant kingdoms, or which are viruses, 
mycoplasmas or other pathogens and includes genetically modified plant pests." 
                                                 
24Graham S. Pearson, Article X: Further Building Blocks, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, 
Briefing Paper No.7 (First Series), March 1998, paragraph 17 - 22.  Available at http://www.brad.ac. 
uk/acad/sbtwc 
25United Kingdom, The Plant Health (Great Britain) Order 1993, Statutory Instrument S.I. 1993/1320. 




The controlled pathogens and pests may only be imported into Great Britain for experimental 
purposes under a licence issued by the appropriate Minister.  
 
46.   Applications for a licence are required to be submitted at least one month before the 
licence is required.  Issue of the licence will be subject, if necessary, to a prior inspection of 
the premises in which the material is to be kept.   The licence will prescribe conditions that 
are designed to ensure that the material imported, moved or kept does not pose a risk to plant 
health.   These will include instructions for the safe transport of licensed material, where and 
how it should be contained and arrangements for its safe disposal.   After issue of a licence, 
licensed premises will be visited to monitor compliance with licence terms and conditions.    
The frequency of such visits will be influenced by factors such as the plant health risk 
associated with the type of material imported or kept.    It is clear from the Order that an 
inspector on entering premises "may take with him such other persons, including, but not 
limited to, representatives of the European Commission, and such equipment and vehicles as 
are necessary for the exercise of his powers...".   The inspector also has rights to sample as 
the Order states that 
 
"an inspector ... may at all reasonable times ... for any other purpose of this Order, 
including checking compliance with it, enter any premises, examine and mark any 
part of the premises or any objects on the premises and examine, take samples of, 
photograph or mark any plant pest, plant, plant product or other object or anything 
which has been or may have been in contact therewith;" 
 
47.   The Order also requires that an official register be kept containing the name and address 
of each business, individual or other organisation which applies for registration. Such 
organisations on the register are required to keep records and these are to be inspected at least 
once in each calendar year. 
 
48.   It is also made clear that although licensed material may be provided to persons or 
organizations within Great Britain who hold a relevant DEFRA (Department of the 
Envronment, Food and Rural Affairs) licence, such material must not be made available to 
other persons or organisations without written agreement from the Plant Health Division for 
DEFRA who will make arrangements for the issue of phytosanitary certificates or plant 
passports or for endorsement of letters of authority.  
 
49.   The Order also lays down the requirements for the movement of otherwise prohibited 
material.   The principal requirement is for a letter of authority to accompany all material 
imported under licence; this letter of authority is issued by the relevant Ministry, DEFRA.   
Where material covered by a licence and a letter of authority is imported from another 
member state in the European Community, it is the responsibility of the licensee, where 
possible, to have the letter of authority endorsed by the plant health authorities in that 
member state.    In addition, the European Community measures require that in the case of 
certain plants, plant products and other objects originating in the Community, the material 
must be accompanied by a plant passport issued under the authority of the plant health 
services of the exporting member state;  the plants to which this requirement applies are listed 
in Schedule 5, Part A of the Plant Health Order 1993.   If certain plants, plant products or 
other objects are to be introduced from a third country (ie a country outside the Community) 
then the material must be accompanied wherever possible by a phytosanitary certificate 
issued in the country of origin;  the plants to which this requirement applies are listed in 




50.  The Order also includes the prohibition of the import, movement or keeping of any plant 
pest which has been genetically modified and any plant material that has been modified such 
that it contains material derived from a plant pest.   Genetically modified plant pests are 
defined in the Order as: 
 
""genetically modified plant pest" means a plant pest, the genetic component of which 
has been modified, and includes - 
 
a.  organisms and material which contain such a plant pest or parts thereof, 
and 
 
b.  any other modified organisms likely to be injurious to plants..." 
 
The legislation also prohibits any activity that involves genetic modification of a plant pest as 
it states that: 
 
"No person shall without the authority of an inspector engage in any activity which 
involves genetic modification of a plant pest or engage in any activity which to his 
knowledge involves genetically modified plant pests." 
 
Regulatory Measures: Security of Biological Agents 
 
51.  Additional requirements addressing the security of biological agents were enacted in the 
United Kingdom in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 200126 which includes as 
Part 7 Security of Pathogens and Toxins.   This includes the following elements: 
 
a.  Duty to notify Secretary of State before keeping or using any dangerous substance; 
b.  Power to require information about security of dangerous substances; 
c.  Power to require information about persons with access to dangerous substances; 
d.  Duty to comply with security directions; 
e.  Duty to dispose of dangerous substances; 
f.  Denial of access to dangerous substances; 
 
Part 7 sets out the pathogens and toxins to which these requirements apply as being those 
pathogens and toxins listed in Schedule 5 to the Act and includes provision for the Secretary 
of State to add any pathogen or toxin to that Schedule if he is satisfied that the pathogen or 
toxin is capable of endangering life or causing serious harm to human health.   The term 
"dangerous substance" is defined as meaning anything which consists of or includes a 
substance for the time being mentioned in Schedule 5 as well as anything which is infected 
with or otherwise carries any such substance. 
 
52.  The Act also includes the power to extend the requirements to animal or plant pathogens, 
pests or toxic chemicals.   This extension may be exercised in relation to any pathogen or pest 
only if the Secretary of State is satisfied that there is a risk that the pathogen or pest is of a 
description that could be used to cause: 
 
a.  widespread damage to property; 
                                                 




b.  significant disruption to the public; or 
c.  significant alarm to the public. 
 
In respect of chemicals, this extension may be exercised in relation to any chemical only if 
the Secretary of State is satisfied that the chemical is capable of endangering life or causing 
serious harm to human health. 
 
53.  The detailed provisions include the following: 
 
a. The notification before keeping or using any dangerous substance must: 
(a) identify the premises in which the substance is kept or used; 
(b) identify any building or site of which the premises form part; 
 
b.  The information about security of dangerous substances includes both  
(a) measures taken to ensure the security of any building or site of which the 
premises form part; and 
(b) measures taken for the purpose of ensuring access to the substance is given 
only to those whose activities require access and only in circumstances that 
ensure the security of the substance. 
 
c.  The information  required about persons with access to dangerous substances 
includes a list of-  
  
(a) each person who has access to any dangerous substance kept or used there; 
(b) each person who, in such circumstances as are specified or described in the 
notice, has access to such part of the premises as is so specified or described; 
(c) each person who, in such circumstances as are specified or described in the 
notice, has access to the premises; or 
(d) each person who, in such circumstances as are specified or described in the 
notice, has access to any building or site of which the premises form part. 
 
d.  Denial of access to dangerous substances.  The provisions set out that "the 
Secretary of State may give directions to the occupier of any relevant premises 
requiring him to secure that the person identified in the directions: 
  
(a) is not to have access to any dangerous substance kept or used there; 
 (b) is not to have, in such circumstances (if any) as may be specified or 
described in the directions, access to such part of the premises as is so 
specified or described; 
 (c) is not to have, in such circumstances (if any) as may be specified or 
described in the directions, access to the premises; or 
 (d) is not to have, in such circumstances (if any) as may be specified or 
described in the directions, access to any building or site of which the 
premises form part." 
 




54.   An example of the regulatory measures relating to genetic modification are the UK 
Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 200027 which entered into 
force on 15 November 2000 and UK Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) 
Regulations 200228 which entered into force on 17 October 2002.  These Regulations 
implemented in the United Kingdom the corresponding EC Directives. 
 
55.  The contained use regulations set out the requirements for: 
 
a.  Risk assessment and notification of activities involving genetic modification which 
include: 
i. Notification of the intention to use premises for the first time for activities 
involving genetic modification; 
ii.  Notification of class 2 activities involving genetic modification of micro-
organisms; 
iii.  Notification of class 3 or 4 activities involving genetic modification of 
micro-organisms; 
b.  Conduct of activities involving genetic modification which includes containment 
and control measures for activities involving genetic modification of micro-
organisms; 
 
The classes of activity involving genetic modification are set out as: 
 
• Class 1.  Activities of no or neglible risk for which containment level 1 is 
appropriate to protect humans and the environment. 
• Class 2.  Activities of low risk for which containment level 2 is appropriate to 
protect humans and the environment. 
•  Class 3.  Activities of moderate risk for which containment level 3 is appropriate to 
protect humans and the environment. 
•  Class 4.  Activities of high risk for which containment level 4 is appropriate to 
protect humans and the environment. 
 
56.  The notification of the intention to use premises for the first time in activities involving 
genetic modification requires that no such use shall take place until an acknowledgement has 
been received from the competent authority of the notification.   In regard to notifications to 
carry out class 2 activities, an acknowledgement is required from the competent authority, 
whilst in respect of notifications to carry out class 3 or 4 activities, prior written consent is 
required from the competent authority. 
 
57.  The regulations also require that a person who undertakes an activity involving genetic 
modification shall ensure that: 
 
a.  the exposure of humans and the environment to genetically modified micro-
organisms is reduced to the lowest level that is reasonably practicable; and 
b.   harm to humans arising from an activity involving genetic modification of 
organisms other than micro-organisms is reduced to the lowest level that is reasonably 
practicable; 
                                                 
27United Kingdom, Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 2000, Statutory Instrument 
S.I. 2000/2831.  Available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk 
28United Kingdom, Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) Regulations 2002, Statutory 




It goes on to require that for any activity involving genetic modification of micro-organims, 
the measures to be taken to comply with the above requirement shall include the general 
principles of good microbiological practice and of good occupational safety and hygiene as 
detailed in Schedule 7 to the regulations.    
 
58.  The regulations also require that a register be maintained of genetic modification 
activities which shall be open for inspection by members of the public.  Provisions are 
included for the exclusion of certain information regarded as confidential from this register.  
In addition, an amendment29 to the regulations which entered into force on 8th February 
2002, provides for information to be made confidential in the interests of national security 
and thus excluded from the public register. 
 
Regulatory Measures: Export Controls 
 
59.  Article III of the BTWC requires that: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce 
any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise 
acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified 
in article I of this Convention.  
 
Successive Review Conferences have emphasised the importance of this Article and at the 
Fourth Review Conference, the States Parties in the Article III section of the Final 
Declaration30 stated that: 
 
The Conference affirms that Article III is sufficiently comprehensive to cover any 
recipient whatsoever at international, national or subnational levels. 
 
60.  There is thus a clear requirement for States Parties to take national measures to control 
transfers and thereby meet their obligations in Article III of the Convention.  In the United 
Kingdom, this is achieved through the implementation of the European Council Regulation 
(EC) 1334/200031 which set up a community wide regime for the control of exports of dual- 
use items and technology.   This Regulation as well as imposing controls on the export of 
dual-use equipment also imposes controls on exports of certain dual-use technology and in 
particular the technology required for the development, production or use of listed items.   
This also introduces a licensing requirement on both physical and electronic transfers of 
information.   It includes an "end-use" control which applies to any dual-use items not 
included in the Annex to the Regulation where the exporter is informed by the Government 
are or may be intended for use in connection with a weapons of mass destruction or related 
missile programme.  This WMD end-use control applies to both physical and electronic 
transfers of technology as well as to exports of goods.   It should be noted that there are no 
                                                 
29United Kingdom, Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) (Amendment) Regulations 2002, 
Statutory Instrument S.I. 2002/63.  Available at http://www.opbw.org and at http://www.hmso.gov.uk 
30United Nations, The Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Document, Geneva, 25 November - 6 December 1996, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996, Part II. p. 
17.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
31European Community, Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community 
regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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exemptions for information in the public domain or for basic scientific research with respect 
to the end-use control since all European Member states agreed that deliberately to send to a 
known WMD proliferator even a published book or article which might be of use to that 
WMD programme should require a licence.  
 
61.  The national implementation of this regime in the United Kingdom is currently through 
the Export of Goods (Control) Order of 199432 and the Dual-Use Items (Export Control) 
Regulations 200033 and its subsequent amendments in which the term "microroganisms" is 
defined as follows: 
 
"microorganisms" means bacteria, viruses, mycoplasms, rickettsiae, chlamydiae or 
fungi, whether natural, enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live 
cultures or as material including living material which has been deliberately 
inoculated or contaminated with such cultures. 
 
and toxins as: 
 
"toxins" means toxins in the form of deliberately isolated preparations or mixtures, no 
matter how produced, other than toxins present as contaminants of other materials 
such as pathological specimens, crops, foodstuffs or seedstocks of microorganisms. 
 
The approach taken in the United Kingdom was outlined in considerable detail in Briefing 
Paper No. 12 (First Series)34 of October 1998.   It was noted in Briefing Paper No. 12 that the 
UK was currently considering revision of its legislation regarding Strategic Export Controls 
with a view to new primary legislation.  It has subsequently been decided to introduce new 
primary legislation which was adopted by the passage of the Export Control Act 200235 on 24 
July 2002.  Action is currently being taken to introduce the secondary legislation to 
strengthen and modernise the United Kingdom's export control regime which will also 
include controls on transfers of technology by intangible means and on the provision of 
technical assistance abroad.   It should be noted that there are no exemptions for information 
in the public domain or for basic scientific research with respect to the end-use control since 
all European Member states agreed that deliberately to send to a known WMD proliferator 
even a published book or article which might be of use to that WMD programme should 




62.  This Briefing Paper provides an input to the meetings of experts and of the States Parties 
by first collecting the relevant language from Final Declarations regarding national measures 
and analysing its progressive evolution theme by theme. It is strongly recommended that this 
language from previous Review Conference Final Declarations should be used as the basis 
for the "conclusions or results" of the experts meeting and the subsequent meeting of the 
States Parties.  Those meetings will thereby be enabled to take forward the cumulative 
                                                 
32United Kingdom, Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994, Statutory Instrument S.I. 1994/1191, 24 April 1994.  
Available at http://www.opbw.org and at http://www.hmso.gov.uk 
33United Kingdom, Dual-Use Items (Export Control) Regulations 2000, Statutory Instrument S.I. 2000/2620, 20 
September 2000.  Available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk 
34Graham S. Pearson, Article III: Some Building Blocks, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, 
Briefing Paper No.12 (First Series), October 1998, paragraphs 10 - 32.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/ 
acad/sbtwc 
35United Kingdom, Export Control Act 2002. Available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk  
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process of regime-building, through recording agreements among States Parties on common 
understandings with regard to the implications and implementation of Article IV.  Having 
established this basis, recommendations should be added for promoting best practice, as 
evaluated by the new process.  This will necessarily involve pooling the implementation 
experience of States Parties, as well as examining the text of their national measures, in the 
light of the need to capture comprehensively the BTWC prohibitions and to make them 
effective. 
 
63.  The Briefing Paper then provides an example, drawing largely on the legislation and 
other regulatory measures for one State Party, of the input on national measures that all States 
Parties should be able to make to the meetings.  It is evident that in addition to national 
measures enacting the basic prohibitions of the BTWC into national legislation most States 
Parties will also have regulatory measures relating to biological agents and toxins;  such 
measures are likely to  relate to health and safety, to those working with the biological agents 
and toxins, to security of the biological agents and toxins, to protection of the environment, 
and to control of transfers, both nationally and internationally. Many such regulatory 
measures will have been adopted primarily for reasons unconnected with the implementation 
of the BTWC yet they contribute directly to the effective national implementation of the 
Convention and ensure that the prohibitions of Article III are implemented in addition to 
those of Article I.   Consequently, all States Parties will have examples of national measures -
- whether legislation, regulations or other measures -- which contribute to the effective 
implementation of the Convention and thus will contribute to the meetings in 2003 of the 
experts and of the States Parties.  It is strongly recommended that all States Parties provide 
information and copies of their legislation, regulations and other measures of BTWC national 
implementation to the Secretariat in Geneva prior to the experts meeting. 
